Libya Conflict
This series will give an in-depth look at Turkey's recent foreign policy decisions. International media sources agree that President Erdogan's administration has taken an increasingly hard line on foreign affairs. However, there are overtly expansionist policies that have not hit the headlines.
The series is broken into four parts; an introduction to the issues and foreign policy theories, the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Libya conflict, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Libya represents a strategically important part of Turkish foreign policy. The reasons which led to Turkey’s intervention in the Libyan conflict are inherently expansionist as they focus on military and economic footholds in the region.
As Turkey’s neo-Ottoman policies develop, footholds in North Africa and the Islamic world are strategic necessities (Quamar, 2020, p. 1). Libya would provide a military centre from which Turkey can exert influence. Libya also offers Turkey the opportunity to assert its claim over natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. In a strategic review of Turkey’s Libyan policy, Şaban Kardaş (2020) views their recent actions from the perspective of a “new map of control” (p. 11). Turkey’s current involvement in the Libyan theatre could directly relate to their aim of regional hegemony.
Turkey’s recent engagement in Libya involved the sales of arms and military support of the Government of National Accord (GNA) (International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 23). Reports also claim that Turkey has engaged Syrian mercenaries to support GNA forces (Vohra, 2020). These contributions reversed the conflict's course supporting Tripoli's defence and successful counteroffensive against the Libyan National Army (Kardaş, 2020, p. 3).
Turkey's Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, centre, and other top Turkish military commanders, right, greet Libyan commanders, at an airport in Tripoli. Photo credit: VOA News
Under the UN arms ban, The European Union (EU) sanctioned Turkey for its support of the GNA. In September, the EU froze a Turkish shipping company's assets after the French navy caught a Turkish vessel smuggling weapons into Libya (Reuters, 2020). The ban, enacted in 2011, has not been consistently executed, and many countries have also flaunted the sanctions (Walsh, 2020). The UAE and the Russian proxy, the Wagner group, are accused of providing military supplies; neither country has faced sanctions (Michaelson, 2020). EU members have condemned Turkish arms sales, and the French and German foreign ministries have stated that Turkey’s recent involvement has prevented the progress of peace negotiations (Wintour, 2020). These accusations and sanctions show a potential bias from other regional actors.
The conflict's geopolitical importance has drawn many actors and blocs interested in the political outcome. Turkey has maintained a unilateral opposition to the Russian and European blocs in recent months. Turkey’s maritime agreements with the GNA, which endanger the EastMed pipeline, are the foundations of European tensions (Telci, 2021, p. 169). The deals, which exclude Greece from Eastern Mediterranean natural gas resources, redraw maritime borders. Russia aims to establish a naval base in Tobruk. Turkey seeks to avoid competition for military dominance and establish a neo-Ottoman regional hegemony (Colombo and Varvelli, 2020). However, it is clear that the many actors in the Libyan conflict endeavour to limit Turkish expansion.
Turkey’s Libya intervention links both their Strategic Depth and Blue Homeland doctrines. In developing economic, cultural, and military relations with Libya, Turkey expands its sphere of influence to Northern Africa. Not only does Turkey’s intervention strengthen its sphere of influence, but it also deepens their economic commitment. Before the intervention, Turkey’s investments in Libya totalled $200 billion; recent developments in the maritime deals would allow Turkey profitable access to 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources (Tekir, 2020, p. 204; United States Geological Survey, 2010).
The link between economic expansion and Turkish intervention is evident is highlighted by the maritime deals with the GNA. The agreements enshrined the Blue Homeland doctrine because they officially state the expanded borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey maintains that the deal involves trade with Libya and is unconnected to their intervention (International Crisis Group, 2020). However, these agreements' coincidence indicates Turkish intentions to further the Blue Homeland and Strategic Depth doctrines.
The Blue Homeland doctrine finds its most ardent opposition amongst the European Union members. Turkey’s excursions in the Eastern Mediterranean are perceived as a provocation that adds to mounting tensions over Northern Cyprus's status. These expansionist actions develop tensions in both security and political relations between Turkey and the EU. The next part of the Ottoman Outlook series discusses the issues in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Sources:
Colombo, M. and Varvelli, A. (2020). Libya: A Failed State in the Middle of the Mediterranean. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2020. Barcelona: IEMed, pp.84–89.
International Crisis Group (2020). Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters. [online] Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/257-turkey-libya-troubled-waters.pdf.
Kardaş, Ş. (2020). Turkey’s Libya policy: militarization of regional policies and escalation dominance. China International Strategy Review.
Michaelson, R. (2020). Turkey and UAE openly flouting UN arms embargo to fuel war in Libya. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/07/turkey-and-uae-openly-flouting-un-arms-embargo-to-fuel-war-in-libya [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Quamar, M. (2020). Turkey and the Regional Flashpoint in Libya. Strategic Analysis, pp.1–6.
Reuters (2020). Turkey says EU sanctions on Turkish firm over Libya embargo show bias. Reuters. [online] 22 Sep. Available at: https://in.reuters.com/article/libya-security-turkey-eu/turkey-says-eu-sanctions-on-turkish-firm-over-libya-embargo-show-bias-idINL5N2GJ0CX [Accessed 4 Dec. 2020].
Tekir, G. (2020). Russian-Turkish Involvement in the Civil War in Libya. Turkish Journal of Russian Studies, (2), pp.190–215.
Telci, I.N. (2021). Turkey’s Quest for Influence in the Mediterranean in the Post-Arab Uprisings Era. In: R. Mason, ed., Transnational Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean. [online] London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.163–181. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7 [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
United States Geological Survey (2010). Natural Gas Potential Assessed in Eastern Mediterranean. United States Geological Survey. [online] 8 Apr. Available at: https://www.usgs.gov/news/natural-gas-potential-assessed-eastern-mediterranean [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Vohra, A. (2020). It’s Syrian vs. Syrian in Libya. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/05/libya-civil-conflict-syrian-mercenaries-turkey-russia-gna-haftar/ [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Walsh, D. (2020). In Libya, Toothless U.N. Embargo Lets Foreign States Meddle with Impunity. The New York Times. [online] 2 Feb. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/world/middleeast/libya-un-arms-embargo.html [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Wintour, P. (2020). Turkey and Russia’s deepening roles in Libya complicate peace efforts. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/05/turkey-and-russia-deepening-roles-in-libya-complicate-peace-efforts [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].