Nagorno-Karabakh
This series will give an in-depth look at Turkey's recent foreign policy decisions. International media sources agree that President Erdogan's administration has taken an increasingly hard line on foreign affairs. However, there are overtly expansionist policies that have not hit the headlines.
The series is broken into four parts; an introduction to the issues and foreign policy theories, the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Libya conflict, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey has been a close ally of Azerbaijan since its independence in 1991. The rhetoric surrounding their relationship often refers to "one nation with two states", showing a close bond between the countries (Ismayilov and Graham, 2016). This friendly cultural connection pairs with technical military cooperation and a mutual defence agreement (Gurbanov, 2018, p. 256). As part of this relationship, Turkey had avoided active involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh' frozen conflict' and refrained from rapprochement with Armenia (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 4). Turkish support for Azerbaijan led to the Armenian border's closure after the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum and 'occupation' in 1991.
After the outbreak of violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh region on September 27th, Turkey embraced an active role in the conflict. Turkey has developed a system of proxy warfare by employing mercenaries to support their preferred actors in foreign territories (Guzansky, Rakov and Lindenstrauss, 2020). While Turkey denied engaging military contractors in Nagorno-Karabakh, there is confirmed evidence of Syrian mercenaries employed by Turkey to assist Azerbaijani forces (Hincks, 2020). This method allows Turkey to dominate a conflict without involving Turkish military personnel. In Nagorno-Karabakh, however, Turkey contributed military personnel and supplies to Azerbaijan. Reports which have surfaced since the ceasefire agreement show large Turkish troop movements to Azerbaijan in the days and months preceding and during the conflict (Toksabay, 2020; Chernenko, 2020). Evidence of Turkish weapons used by Azerbaijan increased international tensions when Canada implemented an arms sales ban on Turkey after identifying Canadian drones sold to Turkey used by Azerbaijan's forces (Detsch and Grammer, 2020).
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, centre, and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, right, review an honour guard during a welcome ceremony in Baku, Azerbaijan, on Dec. 10, 2020. Photo Credit: Associated Press
Despite their involvement through mercenaries and military support, Turkey called for an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Unlike other states that desired territorial negotiations, Turkey demanded the withdrawal of Armenian forces from "occupied territory" (Keddie, 2020). The final ceasefire agreement gives Turkey's military access to the border region, a military centre, and drone abilities (Al Jazeera, 2020b). However, Russia and Turkey's combined 'peace-keeping force' has been described as a pseudo-occupation both in military strategy and physical presence (Bennetts, 2020). The failure of two previous ceasefire agreements highlights Turkey's growing dominance in the region. The deals, facilitated by Russia, failed within hours without Turkish backing (Al Jazeera, 2020a). This unusual resistance indicates that Russian dominance in the South Caucuses is waning, favouring Turkey.
Turkey's dominance of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a clear example of its "Strategic Depth" policy evolving into an expansionist strategy. Turkey's steadfast support of Azerbaijan directly contradicted the previous stance to maximise policy options through friendly relations. Kevork Oskanian's (2011) analysis of Turkish foreign policy strategy highlights Turkey's past avoidance of significant changes in its regional landscape (p. 27). In contrast, the developments between Armenia and Azerbaijan exhibit a massive shift in the environment as Turkey claims victory in a decades-old conflict. The conflict also established a precedent for Turkish military involvement in their "lebensraum". This precedent underlines the expansion of Turkish power in the region and, as the cornerstone of the ceasefire agreement, some argue that Turkey has risen to regional hegemony (Meakem, 2020). The Turkish and Azeri foreign ministries have propagated the idea of a war victory with parades planned in mid-December and bilateral talks on regional issues to celebrate (Daily Sabah, 2020). Public exhibitions of military triumph and cooperation, a reminder of their joint past under the Ottoman Empire, contribute to the growing sense of Turkish neo-Ottomanism and expansionary foreign policy.
The intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh is another example of Turkey's mercenary-led warfare method. While the Syrian conflict was the first recognised use of this method, Turkey's involvement in Libya has been active recently. The proxy war in Libya highlights another area of Turkish expansionism which increases tension within the Middle East and the international community. The next part of the Ottoman Outlook series focuses on the Libyan conflict.
Sources:
Al Jazeera (2020a). Nagorno-Karabakh fighting continues as second truce fails to hold. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/19/nagorno-karabkh-fighting-resumes-despite-ceasefire-commitment [Accessed 29 Oct. 2020].
Al Jazeera (2020b). Turkish parliament approves troop deployment to Nagorno-Karabakh. [online] www.aljazeera.com. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/18/turkish-parliament-approves-troop-deployment-to-nagorno-karabakh [Accessed 4 Dec. 2020].
Bennetts, M. (2020). Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Azeris claim victory over Armenia as Putin sends in peacekeepers. The Times. [online] 11 Nov. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-azeris-claim-victory-over-armenia-as-putin-sends-in-peacekeepers-nc669b96h [Accessed 4 Dec. 2020].
Chernenko, E. (2020). Принуждение к конфликту. Kommersant. [online] 16 Oct. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4537733#id1962787 [Accessed 4 Dec. 2020].
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Guzansky, Y., Rakov, D. and Lindenstrauss, G. (2020). The Use of Mercenaries: A New Recourse to an Old Practice for Waging War in the Middle East. Institute for National Security Studies, pp.1–4.
Hincks, J. (2020). Armenia’s Prime Minister Accuses Turkey of “Reinstating the Ottoman Empire” in Sending Mercenaries to Nagorno Karabakh. [online] Time. Available at: https://time.com/5896422/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-2020/ [Accessed 11 Oct. 2020].
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Mikhelidze, N. (2010). The Azerbaijan-Russia-Turkey Energy Triangle and its Impact on the Future of Nagorno-Karabakh. [online] Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, pp.1–9.
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Toksabay, E. (2020). Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged before Nagorno-Karabakh fighting. Reuters. [online] 14 Oct. Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-turkey-arms/turkish-arms-sales-to-azerbaijan-surged-before-nagorno-karabakh-fighting-idUSKBN26Z237 [Accessed 4 Dec. 2020].