Eastern Mediterranean
This series will give an in-depth look at Turkey's recent foreign policy decisions. International media sources agree that President Erdogan's administration has taken an increasingly hard line on foreign affairs. However, there are overtly expansionist policies that have not hit the headlines.
The series is broken into four parts; an introduction to the issues and foreign policy theories, the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Libya conflict, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkish research explorations in the Eastern Mediterranean have been a flashpoint for their relations with the European Union in recent months. Notably, the Turkish research vessels used for seismic surveys have an entourage of Turkish Navy warships (Marcus, 2020). The disputed waters in which they are operating form part of the Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (Patrikarakos, 2020). Therefore, EU countries and others, such as the United States, view these explorations as illegal because they violate Greek sovereign waters (Von Der Burchard, 2020). On the other hand, Turkey argues that the current maritime borders are an “imprisonment” imposed by the European Union (International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 9). While the economic benefits of natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean are attractive, Turkey views the issue as a national security concern. The EastMed pipeline forum developed by EU countries has expanded, and Turkey fears that it will become a new geopolitical pact in the region (Köse and Öztürk, 2020, p. 122). Therefore, Turkey’s assertion of dominance can be seen as a pre-emptive action against the potential threat to its goal of regional hegemony.
This map shows Greek and Turkish overlapping claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Photo credit: BBC
Turkey’s view of the Eastern Mediterranean issue as a national security threat is more powerful when viewed in the context of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey argues that the areas of maritime jurisdiction claimed by Cyprus and Greece infringe on the sovereign waters of the TRNC (Telci, 2021, p. 170). The EU, however, does not recognise the sovereignty of the autonomous region and considers it occupied territory. The rights to natural resources in these areas are of great concern, and it is under this context, Turkey deems the EastMed pipeline illegal. Furthermore, Turkey’s unwillingness to recognise the Republic of Cyprus has undermined diplomatic negotiations on the issue (International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 10).
Since the Turkish military intervention in 1974, the international community has disputed the sovereignty of the TRNC. At the time of writing, the de jure status of the TRNC remains an occupied territory; the de facto situation is a Turkish political enclave with close ties to Ankara (Becke, 2019). In recent months President Erdoğan has encouraged a two-state solution which would officially create an independent TRNC (Stamouli, 2020). This solution would assign sovereign waters to the TRNC and ensure Turkish access to natural gas resources. Turkish officials claim that they intend to safeguard Turkish Cypriots' political and physical security. International consensus maintains that the aim of this policy is Eastern Mediterranean dominance. A two-state solution would show power over the EU, allow undisputed access to areas of the Levant Basin, and solidify Turkey’s position as the regional hegemon.
Despite mounting tensions over the issue, Turkish determination to dominate the natural gas resources in the area has justified their highly controversial policies. The Blue Homeland and neo-Ottoman Strategic Depth doctrines intertwine consistently throughout this issue's development. The Blue Homeland doctrine would be satisfied by an independent TRNC that would allocate additional maritime territory to Turkey. This outcome would allow access to natural gas resources and prevent the EastMed pipeline forum developing as a geopolitical entity to challenge Turkish expansion.
This solution would also support the expansionist neo-Ottoman version of the Strategic Depth Doctrine. It would give legitimacy to a Turkish enclave in the Eastern Mediterranean and the GNA maritime deals. Turkey would gain Strategic Depth in economic ties with both actors and recognised footholds in Europe and North Africa.
These issues redefine the Turkish foreign policy stance of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ to a neo-Ottoman expansionist perspective. Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean has caused far more tensions than the Turkish interventions in Nagorno-Karabakh or Libya. Western bias and self-interest are critical factors in the international response and evident when considering multiple sources. However, the lack of active opposition suggests that Turkey has chosen an effective expansionist strategy.
In recent months Turkey’s foreign policy decisions have supported the Blue Homeland doctrine and the new neo-Ottoman form of Strategic Depth doctrine. Turkish actions in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean have moved Turkey closer to maritime expansion than ever before. Meanwhile, their victory in Nagorno-Karabakh and progress in Libya have bolstered Turkey’s neo-Ottoman strategy through a precedent of military and mercenary intervention without international interference. Progress on both of these expansionist initiatives will largely depend on the new United States administration's willingness to intervene in the region. However, Turkey’s success in Nagorno-Karabakh has bolstered its dominance to potential regional hegemony.
Sources:
Becke, J. (2019). Varieties of expansionism: A comparative-historical approach to the study of state expansion and state contraction. Political Geography, 72, pp.64–75.
International Crisis Group (2020). Turkey Wades into Libya’s Troubled Waters. [online] Brussels: International Crisis Group. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/257-turkey-libya-troubled-waters.pdf.
Köse, T. and Öztürk, B. (2020). A Sea of Change in the MENA Region: External Intervention in Libya. Insight Turkey, pp.113–138.
Marcus, J. (2020). The Eastern Mediterranean tinderbox: Why Greek-Turkish rivalries have expanded. BBC News. [online] 25 Aug. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53906360 [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Patrikarakos, D. (2020). Did Erdogan order his generals to sink a Greek warship? | The Spectator. [online] The Spectator. Available at: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/did-erdogan-order-his-generals-to-sink-a-greek-warship [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Stamouli, N. (2020). Erdoğan calls for ‘two-state’ solution for Cyprus. [online] Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-calls-for-two-state-solution-for-cyprus/ [Accessed 6 Dec. 2020].
Telci, I.N. (2021). Turkey’s Quest for Influence in the Mediterranean in the Post-Arab Uprisings Era. In: R. Mason, ed., Transnational Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean. [online] London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.163–181. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-54444-7 [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].
Von Der Burchard, H. (2020). Germany to Turkey: Calm tensions or face EU sanctions. [online] Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/german-foreign-minister-issues-sanctions-warning-to-turkey/ [Accessed 5 Dec. 2020].