Democratization and Security
This series will give an in-depth look at women's security in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI). Gender politics and violence have long been hot topics in international discourse. The emphasis the UN and western democracies place on gender equality has led to extensive research on women's lived experiences. The Middle East, in particular, has found itself under the microscope. Trigger Warning: This series contains a discussion of domestic violence, sexual violence, murder, and modern slavery.
The series is broken into five parts; an introduction to the area and issues, democratization and gender security, independence movements and gender representation, the ISIS occupation and gender oppression, and conclusions on gendered life in the KRI.
After the Iraqi Constitution's codification in 2004, the Kurdish Regional Government continued to develop democratic norms within the Kurdish region. Unlike many other ethnoreligious groups, the Kurds have developed a more tolerant society of liberal secular policies. The restoration of democratic rights to all citizens dramatically changed freedoms of expression and association in the KRI. These freedoms opened avenues for women and activists to participate in a meaningful way to progress on human rights issues. As part of this, the KRG encouraged mass social movements such as those for women's rights and against gender violence. Some actors and academics have argued that this attitude attempts to convince the international community that the KRI can secede from Iraq proper.
Nevertheless, the development of democratic institutions and norms has led to social movements expanding their role and making progress in Kurdish society. Umbrella groups for the women's movement, such as the Stance Group (Grupî Helwêst) and other independent women's advocacy groups, helped solidify activism in the KRI. The women's rights movement has confronted threats to gender security in the KRI through the parliamentary structure, the judicial process, and international activism.
The institutional changes post-2003 that have opened political avenues for activism have been accompanied by a massive growth in NGO and censor-free press representation in the KRI. The "NGOisation" of Kurdish civil society, identified by Kaya (2017), refers to the massive growth of organizations that allocate funds for the advancement of liberal and global agendas (p. 19). These organizations have overwhelmingly pursued women's rights and gender security issues. Al-Ali and Pratt (2008) quote an NGO worker saying that "women's organizations got themselves organized much faster than anyone else" (p. 77), showing the initiative of groups preventing gender violence. They have also been supported by multilateral organizations and states that have provided direct funding and support for creating new organizations (Kaya, 2017, p. 16). The services that women's NGOs have developed are wide-ranging in protecting gender security. The legal and mediation services, counseling and asylum centers, and political advocacy that they provide directly tackle gender violence (Hague, Gill, and Begikhani, 2013, p. 389). Press freedoms have also developed ways to protect gender security. Over 18 free newspapers in the KRI now follow gender issues and attempt to highlight gendered security issues (Joly and Bakawan, 2016, p. 965). The increased publicity surrounding these issues is supported by decreased censorship, the role of social media, and international research in the region.
Through NGOs and activists' work, the KRG has been held accountable by the press in its approach to women's rights issues. This shift in approach was evident in the debate over implementing the Iraqi Penal Code and changes to Personal Status Laws. Islam is the foundational source of legislation in Iraq; therefore, the Penal Code and Status laws enforced by the central Iraq government are derived from Islamic traditions.
The Penal Code's Islamic basis has allowed or reduced punishment for gender-based acts of violence, such as honor killings, female genital mutilation (FGM), and physical chastisement in Iraq. The KRG has implemented and defended amendments to the Iraqi Penal code, which restrict polygamy, dismiss alleviated punishment for honor crimes, and outlaw violence between married individuals in the KRI.
Amendments to the penal code parallel the Act of Combating Domestic Violence (Parliament of Kurdistan- Iraq, 2011). The act criminalizes every violent act and speech, or threat of doing so, based on gender within a family, that may physically, sexually, and psychologically harm an individual. This protection created significant differences between Kurdish women's experience in Iraq and other women in the south and central regions.
The KRG also defended personal status laws that have been changed by the central Iraqi government. Changes to the personal status laws included
lowering the age of marriage for girls to 9 rather than 18,
dismissing accusations of marital rape,
women's rights over their bodies, and
the freedoms guaranteed to women in the 1959 Iraqi personal status laws.
The KRG rejected these attacks on the security of women and refused to implement them in the KRI. The KRG has also developed a national strategy to confront gendered violence that provides maternity and childbirth leave, shelters for domestic violence survivors, and stricter punishments for gendered violence or negligence (Kurdistan Regional Government Supreme Council for Women Affairs, 2012).
The legislative protection of gender security is significant in the KRI and wider-ranging than some western democracies. However, there are reports of limitations in implementing protections and cultural rejection of criminalization of traditional practices.
Al-Ali and Pratt (2008) explain that politicians view honor killings and other forms of gendered violence as family problems, and laws that protect gendered security issues are implemented inconsistently. Kaya (2017) cites an interview with a KRG representative that blames the inconsistent implementation of the new laws on male judges who dominate the KRI's judicial system. The prosecution of these cases is also made more difficult by the nature of gendered violence. Domestic violence remains taboo in many societies, evidence of FGM is inherently intimate, and honor killings are often forced suicides or self-immolation (Mirlashari, Nasrabadi, and Amin, 2017). The NGO’s work, freedom of the press, and liberal legislation is not a substitute for perpetrators' legal prosecution.
The cultural incompatibility of these views is another significant limitation to the new law's effectiveness. The patriarchal structure that dominates a portion of Kurdish culture is to blame for the perpetuation of honor-based violence (Mojab and Hassanpour, 2003, p. 60). The International Rescue Committee, an NGO active in global gender issues, cites a survey in Erbil, which found that 68% of young men believed it was acceptable to kill a girl for damaging a family's honor. While honor killing is by no means a uniquely Kurdish or Iraqi phenomenon, gender security has not increased as much in reality as it has in legislative terms. Despite the criminalization of gender violence and increased protection of gender security through the democratic process, some cultural acceptance exists.
Security is a clear example of an issue that is unequally experienced by different genders. Tickner's (1992) analysis, while it does not discuss the Kurdish experience directly, applies to the threats posed to security by honor killings, FGM, and domestic violence. These crimes are inherently gendered and therefore experienced unequally. The impact of patriarchal culture is also evidenced in the resistance of the democratic structures to change the experience of gender violence (Joly and Bakawan, 2016).
The development of democratic norms of representation in the KRI supports social groups to advocate for women's rights. The democratic structure of the KRI, however, is in constant battle. The desire for an independent Kurdish state is a priority for all major Kurdish political parties. Advocacy for women's rights and gender security can be limited in legislative progress when all prominent political representatives are focused on other issues.
Sources:
Al-Ali, N. and Pratt, N. (2008). women’s organizing and the conflict in Iraq since 2003. Feminist Review, 88(1), pp.74–85.
Hague, G., Gill, A.K. and Begikhani, N. (2013). ‘Honour’-based violence and Kurdish communities: Moving towards action and change in Iraqi Kurdistan and the UK. Journal of Gender Studies, 22(4), pp.383–396.
Joly, D. and Bakawan, A. (2016). Women in Kurdistan-Iraq: issues, obstacles and enablers. The International Journal of Human Rights, 20(7), pp.956–977.
Kaya, Zeynep N (2017). Gender and statehood in the Kurdistan region of Iraq - LSE Research Online. Lse.ac.UK. [online] Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69197/ [Accessed 12 Nov. 2020].
Kurdistan Regional Government Supreme Council for Women Affairs. (2012). National Strategy to Confront Violence Against Women In Kurdistan 2012-2016 (Five Years Plan). Available at: http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/strategy_combat%20violence_against_women_English.pdf
Mirlashari, J., Nasrabadi, A.N. and Amin, P.M. (2017). Living with burn scars caused by self-immolation among women in Iraqi Kurdistan: A qualitative study. Burns, 43(2), pp.417–423.
Mojab, S. and Hassanpour, A. (2003). The Politics and Culture of" Honour Killing": The Murder of Fadime §ahindal. Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture & Social Justice, pp.56–70.
Parliament of Kurdistan-Iraq. (2011). The Act of Combating Domestic Violence in Kurdistan Region- Iraq. Available at: http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/combat_domestic_violence_english.pdf
Tickner, A.J. (1992). Gender in international relations : feminist perspectives on achieving global security. New York: Columbia University Press.